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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah

VITO TODARO and
GUISEPPE FONTANA,
Appellants,

Case No. 8239

-v:s.-

J. D. GARDNER,
Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Appellants in their Statement of Facts review
primarily the court proceedings which first occurred in
the State of Arizona -and subsequntly in the District
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Court in the State of Utah. In order to n1ore accurately
understand the contentions of the Respondent, in maintaining that the cause of action litigated in the State of
Utah, was a different c:aus·e of action than the one litigated in the Arizona courts and therefore the doctrine
of res adjudicata i~ not applicable,. a statement of the
facts and negotiations giving rise to the circumstanee·s
leading up to the litigation is felt to be necessary.
Prior to J une 27, 1947, Respondent had made preliminary investigations concerning the possib~e purchase
of building's constructed by thte appellants at Phoenix,
Ariz. ( R. 18) The buildings had been constructed pursuant to priorities issued by federal agencies wherein the
builders were required to give veterans first priority
on a monthly rental basis; (R. 68, 71) The buildings were
built as a series of duplexes ; ( R. 49) however, they were
susceptible of being used as a motel. (R. 5) On the 27th
day of June, 1947, the Respondent had negotiations with
the Appellants and their attorney (R. 19) as result of
which instructions were given to a Title and Escrow
Company for the purpose of preparing an Escrow Agreement contemplating a sale of the property. (R. 23) At
the time of these negotiations the Appellants were being
pressed by creditors for payments owing on the property
and were anxious to have US'e of any deposit which
might be made by the Respondent. (R. 24, 25, 66) The
Respondent agreed to deposit $5,000.00 to show his good
faith but refused to sign any docum:ents until he had
had
an opportunity to review the contemplated
sale with
.
.
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his attorneys at Salt Lake City and to determine if the
building could he used as a motel without risk of violating Government regulations requiring that property be
given to veterans for rental units on a monthly basis.
(R. 21, 22) A receipt was prepared by the title company
for the deposit of the $5,000.00 by the Respondent and
the Appellant signed this receipt. (R. 26) The form
used for the receipt was an Earnest :Money Agreement.
(R. 2G) However, it varied from the usual preliminary
agreement which is normally signed by the purchaser
who makes a deposit subject to approval by the sellers.
(R. 26) In this case the purchaser rnade the deposit but
refused to sign the agreement and the sellers signed the
agreement evidencing receipt of the $5,000.00. The Escrow Company didn't acknowledge receipt of the money
since it was paid direct to the seller for immediate payment of obligations on the property. It is the theory of
the Respondent that the above transaction constituted
merely an oral agre'ement to purchase subject to an express condition precedent.
The Respondent, after advancing the $5,000.00, made
further investigation and received information from a
newspaper that a criminal complaint had been filed
against the Appellants for violation of the federal regulations previously mentioned. (R. 27, Ex. D-5) The
Respondent further conferred with one of his attorneys,
Mr. Richard L. Bird (R. 28) at Salt Lake City who wrote
a letter to attorneys in Arizona requesting that they
further check into the matter of the regulations and the
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criminal action. (R. 59, Ex. D-13) In addition, the H.espondent and Mr. Lynn S.. Richards went to Phoenix,
Arizona, and ·after further investigation at the federal
agencies involved, concluded that the property could not
he safely operated as a motel free from government
regulations and advised the attorney for the Appellants
that no contract could he made and demanded return of
the $5,000.00. The attorney for the Appellents stated
he would request a return of the 1noney. (R. 32, 52, 53)
At no time did the Respondent sign any agreement
agreeing to purchase the property. The only documnt
signed was a receipt heretofore mentioned, signed by
the Appellants acknowledging receipt of the $5,000.00.
The suit in the trial court in Arizona was based upon
two counts: The trial court found upon the first C'ount,
namely, that the R-espondent had loaned the money to the
Appellants to meet pressing obligations owing on the property. (E.x. D-16 page 21) The Supreme Court of the
State of Arizona reversed the trial court holding that
the transaction did not constitute a loan and limited
their decision to that factual determination. (Ex. P-18)
After the judgment in the trial court in Arizona and
before a reversal by the Supreme Court, the Respondent
had received payment by virtue of garnishment proceedings on the trial court judgment. Although the Supreme
Court had reversed the judgment in favor of the Respon·
dent, since he had received the $5,000.00, there was no
need for him to institute a second proceeding in Arizona
courts· on the correct theory for recovery of his money.
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The Appellants, however, commenced a suit in Utah
based upon a minute entry of the trial court ordering
the Respondent to return the $5,000.00 collected on the
judgment which had been reversed. This minute entry
judgment was merely an order of restitution; not based
upon any trial, and was therefore not an adjudication on
the rnerits as to which of the parties was ultimately
entitled to the money. In the Utah action an affirmative defense sets out the foregoing circumstances and
claims the right to retain the money on the basis that
no contract was ever made and the funds were advanced
upon the expressed condition precedent that if the property could not be operated as a motel, the money would
be returned. The Respondent's theory of the facts and
circumstances, were in practically all respects, substantiated even by the testimoney of one of the Appellants
who testified in the Utah District Court. Mr. Todaro
testified: (R. 72)

"Q. Was anything said about what would
happen if the deal didn't go through'!
A. Well, the only thing Mr. Gardner says,
"If the government has got some restriction on,"
he says, "I will turn it back."
Q. He said if the government has got some
restrictions on, he will turn it back~
A. "And I will take the money back." He
says, "I won't go through with the deal."
Q. If that was so, then you were to give
him back his money?
A. Yes."
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Later, on redirect examination :Jir. Todaro attempted
to explain that the above conversation was had after
the money had been paid. But since the court found
in favor of Respondent and Appellants do not challenge
the finding, any conflict in the evidence must be resolved
in favor of Respondent.
The Appellants do not argue the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify the trial court's decision that the
Respondent was entitled to retain the money, but rather
the appeal is~he sole issue that the judgn1ents of the
Arizona courts constitute a defense of res judicata to
any determination of the matter on the merits ·by the
Utah Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE JUDGMENTS OF THE ARIZONA COURTS
ON A CAUSE OF· ACTION FOR MONEY LOANED IS
NOT RES JUDICATA ON A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSE ·OF ACTION FOR MONEY ADVANCED IN CONTEMPLATION OF A SALE OF
REAL PROPERTY.
The first three points of the Appellant's brief are
all based upon the same argument; namely, that the
court committed error by failing to rule that the judgements of the Arizona C!ourts were res judicata as to
the cause of ·action raised by the affirmative defense.
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For that reason the Respondents will answer the arguments of those points under the single point above mentioned.
To detennine if res judicata is a defense in this
action and to better understand the arguments of the
parties, the scope of the Arizona decision should be
clearly understood.
· The judgment of the Arizona trial court was entered
in favor of the Respondent and against the Appellants
on the first cause of action which was for rnoney loaned.
(D-16 H-12) Part of the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court is as follows :
'The sole question to be detennined in this
case is whether the evidence substantiates plaintiff's cause of action for money loaned. ox, ':~ *"
"A careful and close analysis of the plaintiff's testimony shows that he nowhere testified
directly to having rnade a loan. The sum and
substance of his testimony is to the effect that he
had orally agreed to purchase the property; that
all of the terms and conditions had been agreed
upon except one, * * *"
''It must be remembered that the judgment
under consideration is predicted solely on a complaint for money loaned. 'l_1he cause of action is
not for a rescission of the contract and was not
tried on that theory, and did not seek the return
of the $5,000 on this basis. * * *"
"Plaintiff having failed to produce any direct
testimony or any testimony from which an inference might be reasonably drawn to substantiate
the theory of a loan, we are compelled to hold that
the judgment is wholly unsubstantiated by a:ny
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competent evidence. Undoubtedly the trial court
was influenced by the fact that the defendents,
some days after the abandonment of the contract
by plaintiff, were able to and did sell the court
for $210,000 but upon different tenus. Counsel
have also argued that it would he unfair and inequitable to allow defendents to retain the money
upon the theory that such retention would co~
stitute an unjust enrichment. This argument
has no place here because such a suggestion would
have to be predicated upon the theory of a contract and its rescission. vV e are not here concerned with the rights of a purchaser in a contract for the sale and purchase of land where the
right of rescission is cl'aimed or the attempt is
made to avoid a forfeiture. Plaintiff basis his
right to recover the $5,000 here involved and the
judgment of the trial court was based solely upon
the ground of a loan to defendents. As above
pointed out, this claim is wholly unsupported by
the plaintiff's evidence though giving it, and all
re·asonahle inference to be drawn therefrom, full
faith and credit.
"The judg1nent of the lower court is reversed
and the cause remanded to the trial with directions to enter judgment for the defendant. * * *"
From the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the only issue
adjudicat~d and determined by those decisions was
whether the Respondent was entitled to the return of
the money on the theory of money loaned. The trial in
the Utah District Court was on a completely different
theory, namely, that no contract was made or consummated,· that funds were advanced in anticipation of the
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purchase of property for a motel upon an expressed
condition precedent. There was never any written agreement signed by the Respondent. The Appellant in his
testimoney virtually admitted that the money was
advanced subject to the Respondent satisfying himself
that the properties could be operated as a motel free
and clear of any government regulations to the contrary. It is the contention of the Respondent that the
adjudication of these issues constitutes a separate cause
of action.
A distinction should be made between a whole or
different cause of action and component issues or parts
of the same cause of action. There is no serious argument with the citations of authorities and the proposition stated by the Appellants in their br~~ _t~9-t all issues
of a cause of action which may, can, o~be litigated
in a trial, must be so litigated, and that a decision on
the merits as to that cause of action is a bar to any
further attempt to relitigate any such issues; however,
the rule of law is substantially different where the cause
of action, even though based upon the same facts, is
different in the second suit or trial.
In reply to the first three points of Appellents brief
the Respondent submits that there is only one essential
issue for determination by the court, namely, do the
judgements rendered by the Arizona Courts constitute
res judicata as to the affirrrrative defense, set off, or
counterclaim interposed by the Respondent. It will be
conceded at the outset that if the affirmative defense,
set off, or counterclaim as interpos-ed by the Respondent
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1s the same cause of action as has been litigated in
Arizona, it would be res judicata and the Utah Courts
would be required to give full faith and credit to the
Arizona decisions. On the other hand, if the issues
raised in the set off, affirmative defense, or counterclaim are different and constitute a different cause of
action, then it would not be res judicata and the full
faith ·and credit clause of the Federal Constitution would
have no application.
In the Appellants brief numerous quotations from
both American Juris prudence and Corpus Juris Secundum were set out. Respondents respectfully submits
these additional quotations from those authorities should
be cited.
· 30 Am. J ur. 9'46, Judgments, Sec. 210:
"The doctrine of res judicata is not available
as a bar to a subsequent action if the judgment
in the fonner action was rendered because of a
misconception of the ren1edy available or of the
proper form of proceeding. In such situation,
the plaintiff is entitled to bring the proper proceeding to enforce his action."
50 C. J'. S., Judgments, Sec. 649, Theory of Action
or Recovery:
"Where plaintiff is defeated in an action
based on a certain theory of his legal rights or
as to the legal effects of a given transaction or
state of facts through failure to substantiate his
view of the case, this will not as a rule preclude
him fron1 renewing the litigation, without any
change in the facts, but basing his claim on a new
and more correct theory. It has been held that
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this rule applies where plaintiff ':~< * * in the second suit * * * alleges a different ground of
liability on the part of defendant, where he fails
to establish defendant's liability under a 'vritten
instrument, and afterward seeks recovery as on
a resulting trust or on the ground of fraud or
1nistake, where, having failed to establish a specific lien on property, he sues again on the ground
of the personal liability of defendant; where,
having sued for the price of property and failed
to prove a sale, he brings a new action for its
use or detention; where an unsuccessful attempt
to enforce a liability under a statute is followed
by an action to hold the same defendant liable
on the same facts as at common law or vice versa;
where the two actions are brought under different
statutes; or where, after an adverse decision in
an action brought under state law, plaintiff sues
in the state court under a federal law. A similar
rule as to the right to bring a second action on a
different theory obtains in equity; where .the
equities of a second bill are materially different
from the first, although the origin of both is the
saine, the adjudication of the first is no bar to
the second."
-;,
In Utah-Idaho Central Railway Company vs. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 364, 35 Pac. 2nd 842, 94 A.
L. R. 1423, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval
:from an Indiana case as follows:
"A party who imagins he has two or more
remedies, or who misconceives his rights, is not
to be deprived of all remedy hecause he first
tries a wrong one; which is not inconsistent with
his true and effectual remedy, which he should
have pursued in the first. i~stance .( Citi11g Au-
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thorities.) Election of remedies is the act of
choosing between the different modes of procedure and relief allowed l1Y law on the same
state of facts, which modes ·may be term1'd coexisting remedies. (Citing Text.) rrhe result of
appellee's first action led hjn1 where he was in
the first instance, and his present action to enforce his only ren1edy is not inconsistent therewith."
"In either case he had no chance of any other
existing rernedy. That he in the first instance
and on the facts misconc<:j\'ed the remedy, and
pursued one which the law did not afford him,
did not thereafter bar or estoppe him on the
same facts from pursuing the only legal. remedy
that in the first instance was open to him."
.

In Welsh, Driscoll & Buck vs. Buck, 64, Utah 579,232

P'8..G·• ~li, the court held that a judgnient, in a foreclosure
suit against an estate, dismissing the suit for want of
equity; because the instrument sued on as a mortgage
·was 11ot such in fact, was not a bar to a later assertion
of such claim in the Probate Court. In so doing the court
stated:
"The plaintiffs had erroneously taken the
view that they held a mortgage, which they
sought to establish and foreclose and thereby
satisfy. their claim. There is ample authority to
the effect that, where a mistake had been made
in the pursuance of a ren1edy, such a mistake is
not a bar to the presenting of proper action."
(Citation of Authorities)
The. case of Detroit Heating and Lighting Company
-vs. Stevens 20 Ut. 241, 58 P. 193 also holds in accordance
with the foregoing rule.
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:More recntly the Utah Supreme Court in Commercial
Bank of Spanish Fork vs. Spanish Fork Southern Irrigating Company, 107 Utah 279, 152 Pac. 2nd 547, held
that a prior Inandamus suit seeking to compel the defendants to recognize the plaintiff as a stockholder wherein
it was held that the stock certificate was void did not
bar the subsequent suit to recover damages resulting
from the issuance of the void certificate stating the rule
previously entunerated to the effect that "The fact that
a party by mistake invokes a remody not available to
him under the facts of the case will not prevent him from
pursuing a proper remedy which is available."
Since our courts are only required to give to an
Arizona decision the same effect as would the Arizona
courts, it is submitted that the Arizona cases would not
hold that the prior decisiqn is res judicata, but rather
the Arizona law is in conformity with the law of Utah
as stated above. A brief review of some of the Arizona
cases is as follows:
Williams vs. Williams, 256 Pac. 356, 32 Ariz. 164.
rrhis was an action to secure the second foreclosure of
the same mortgage, on the same property, differing from
the first foreclosure in the respect that the Grantee of
the mortgagor was not 1nade a party to the first foreclosure. Subsequent to the first foreclosure the plaintiff
brought a suit to quiet title against the present defendant,
which suit was concluded against the plaintiff. rrhe plaintiff in his present complaint set out the two prior actions
showing incomplete relief, since the present defendant
was not made a party to the first suit and in the second
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suit -because of an ilnproper choice of remedies. In the
present action the court set aside the first foreclosure
proceedings and granted a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendant asserted that the prior quiet
title proceedings between the parties was res judicata
as to this suit. The court in overruling this defense of
the· defendant stated as follows:
"The .plea of estoppel by the judgment in
the action to quit title is not good for the reason
that the jssues in that case are not involved in
this. The· action to quit title was an assertion or
·contention by plaintiff that his foreclosure against
the mortgagor and the sale threunder, followed .
. by; sheriff's, deed, give him title· as against the
mortgager's grantee, :Mattie L. Williams. This
proposition was unsound, as the law is well settled
that a grantee· of the mortgagor n1ust be made
.. a party defendant in·· the foreclosure before her
interest can be taken fron1. her or subjected to
a sale for the .payxnent of the mortg·age debt. This
suit is an admission of tluit fact and seeks, not
to question :Mattie L. vVilliams' title to a onehalf interest in. lot 23, but ·to subject it in a legal
way to the payment of the mortgage debt. It
admits·· her title. In the action to quiet title the
questl.on as to whether plaintiff's xnortgage had
been paid and satisfied by reason of the first
foreclosure was not- involved. It was apparent
that the. Inortgage debt still subsisted, so for as
defendent Mattie L. Willimns' interest was concerned, and in a proper proceeding, such as this,
could be foreclosed~ The issue· here was not in
·that·· case and could not have been therein deter. mined ... The causes of action. in the two cases are
different. and _the: parti~s. ar~. no~ the- same.
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:Morgan vs. Barrett, 17 Ariz. 376, 153 P. 449;
Harrison vs. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A.)
140 F. i}.l.\5, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas.
314; 15 R. C. L. 964, Sec. 439.
vVe quote as applicable to the fads of this
case, fron1 34 Corpus Juris, 798, as follows:
'The estoppel extends only to the exact point
raised by the pleadings and decided, and does
not operate as a bar to a second suit on other
claims or issu.es, or against other parties.'"
O'Niel vs. Martin, 182, Pac. 2d 839, 66 Ariz. 78. The
Court quoted with approval part of Section 172, 30
Am. Jur. Judgments Section 172, part of which is as
follows:
·• A final judgment rendered by a eourt of
competent jurisdiction, on the merits, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies, and as to them constitutes on absolute
bar to a subsequent action involving the same
claim, de1nand, and cause of action. If, however,
the two suits do not involve the san1e claim,
demand, and cause of action, such effect will
not be ordinarily given to the prior judgment. In
this respect, it is worthy to notice that there must
be not only identity of subject matter, hut also
of the cause of action, so that a judgment in a
forrr1er action does not perate as a bar to a subsequent action, where the cause of action is not
the same, although each action relates to the same
subject matter."
Dowdy vs. Calvi, 125 Pac. 873,. 14 Ariz. 148. rrhe
court in denying a plea of abatement urged by reason
of -~ prior suit, stated as follows:
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"Both pleas are bad when attacked hy a
demurer, because, as a general rule, 1noney is not
replevia;ble property, and where such suit was
commenced therefor its pendency or disposition
adverse to plaintiff does not affect his right to
pursue a valid remedy for its c'onversion. Lovell
vs. Hammond Co., 66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl. 511."
Lee vs. Johnson 216 Pac. 2d 722 (Ariz. 1950). As
to the issue of whether a prior suit involving the property
in question was res judicata in the present action the
Qo"Qrt stated as follows:
"In the prior decisions we have pointed out
the distinction between the effect of a judgment operating by way of ·estoppel in a later
action upon a different cause of action and
. a judgment operating by way of a bar against
a second action upon the sa1ne cause of action.
Both are frequently referred to as res judicata.
Lauderdale vs. Industrial Commission, 60 Ariz.
443, 139 Pac. 2d 449. Before a prior judgment
n1ay bar a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies, there 1nust be an identity
not only of the subject 1natter but also of the
cause of action. This being a suit upon a possessory cause of action, the prior judg1nent quieting title is not a bar to the present suit.''
Pinkerton vs. Pritchard 223 Pac. 2nd 933, 71 Ariz.
117. The second suit involved the same parties and concerned the same strip of land. The court concluded that
the first suit was in ejectment and the present suit was
in trespass. In the first suit ther.e was a determination
that one of the parties had an easement over the property
owned by the other for roadway purposes. Now the sec-
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ond suit is brought to determine if the easmnent can be
used for storage and other purposes. 'rhe Trial Court
in the present suit granted a motion for dismissal of the
case upon the grounds of res judicata and entered judgment accordingly.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court set out extensively
the pleadings i:h the first suit and then concludes that
the two causes of action were different and in doing so
stated as follows:
"But counsel for defendant says these obstructions were there on this trip wh~n the former
case was tried and that these facts should have
been presented to the court at that time and that
under the rule laid down by this court i11 numerous decisions all matters in issue, or whieh could
have been in issue, are conclusively settled by the
judg1nent in that cause. This is undoubtedly the
law in this state. ·Citizen State Bank vs. McRoberts, 29 Ariz. 173, 239 Pac. 1028. But the
question as to what use defendant Pritchard was
putting the property at the time of the former
trial was not a material issue in that case. It was
wholly immaterial there whether he was using
it as a junkyard, as a sto~age place or as a vegetable garden or whether or not he was putting
it to any use whatsoever. It was granted defendant was wrongfully withholding its possession
frmn plaintiff and was then asserted he was the
owner in fee too. That was the sole issue in that
case."
The Supreme Court then reversed the decision of
the Trial Court even though, as a dissenting judge stated:
"'Jlhey have virtually re-written the judgment entered in the first suit and have read into
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the cornplaint in the instant action rnaHers which
no wise appear therein.''
After reading the decision rendered in the former
suit between the parties involved in this action, one can
only conclude that the Supreme Court of Arizona went
to great lengths to reverse the Trial Court as against
the present Respondent and technically and narrowly
construed the pleadings and the decision to support such
revers~al. Espec~a:lly is this true after reading the decision in Pinkerton vs. Pritchard, supra, where the converse approach was applied. In any event the present
Appelants have not shown on what basis they are entitled
to the money. They did not show in the prior action that
they had ~a con'tract whi~h entitled them to forfeit the
down payment, they did not show that there was even a
contract. They did not show that even if there were a
contract, there had been a breach of that con~tract on the
partof theRespondententitlingthem to retain the money,
ri·or have they shown any other grounds or basis by which
they should be entitled to recover the money, and they
apparently are unwilling to challenge the holding of the
tria:l court on the merits.
Some of the recent decisions from other jurisdictions
~upportingthe rule of law quoted above are as follows:
In Orminski vs. Highland Electrical Supply Co., 62
N. E. 2d 14, 326 Ill. App. 392, the appellate court state as
follows:
''The federal court having held on defendant's motion that the ~air Lahor Standards Act
did not cover plaintiff's employment, the judgment entered is res judicta as to his right of action under the act. lt is conclusive on the question
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of ~he applicability of that statute, but not of any
clmm for overtime independent of the statute.
'The doetrine of res judicta is not available as a
bar to a subsequent action if the judgment in the
forn1er action was rendered because of a misconception of the remedy available***' 30 Am. Jur.,
Judgments - 210, citing, wi'th many other cases
in federal and state courts, Schenck v. State Line
Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 311, 312, 144 N. E.
592, 593, 35 A. L. R. 1149, Where Justice Cardoza
said : 'The plain tiff thought he had a remedy at
law, and so thinking sued for damages. In truth
he had no such remedy, for, irrespective of his
knowledge of the fraud, his right of action for
damages had been barred by lapse of time. The
defendants have blocked his recourse to a remedy
which he had not. Thev now say that because of
his mistake, he must be held to have renounced
forever the remedy he had. 'There would be no
sense or principle in such a rule.' Holmes, J.,
in Snow v. Alley, supra (156 Mass. 193, 30 N. E.
691)."
''The situation presented here is analogous
to that involved in Pillsbury v. Early, 324 Ill. 562,
155 N. E. 475. There plaintiff brought suit for
the specific performance of an alleged oral agreeInent of the decedent, John Early, to give to pl:aintiff at his death the farm on which decedent and
his parents were living in consideration of plaintiff's services in caring for decedent and his parents; this bill was dismissed for want of equity;
plaintiff filed her claim in the Probate Court
against decedent's estate, claiming the reasonahl(•
value of the services rendered by her; the claim
was allowed. In overruling the defense that the
decree in the chancery suit was res judicta as to
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all matters involved in the claim·against the es. tate, the Supreme Court ~aid (324 Ill. at pag·e
565, 155 N. E. at page 477): '***where the former
adjudication is relied on a~ an answer and a bar
to the whole cause of action, it must appear that
the things sought to be r<'C'OYered and the cause
of action in both :-;nits are the same (Hanna v.
Read, 102 Ill. 596, 40 Ain. Rep. 608; Sulurian Oil
Co. v. Neil, 277 Ill. 45, 115 N. E. 114), and that
the former judgment necessarily involved the detennination of the same fact, to prove or disproYe
which it is offered in evidence (\Vells v. Robertson, 277 Ill. 534, 115 ~. E. 654.) The issues in the
chancery case and in the instant case were not the
same.''
In Lorang v. Flathead Commercial Company, 119
Pac. 2d 273, 112 Mont. 146, the plaintiff to the second
suit brought the first action alleging an expressed contract
(oral). wherein he claimed that the defendant agreed to
pay him $175.00 per month together with a reasonable
p.ercentage of the net profits earned in the store operated
by defendant. On the trial of the first case, after all of
the evidence was introduced, the court sustained a motion
for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the
grounds that the parties had not Agreed upon a definite
rate of compensation. In the second action the defendant
urged the prior judgment as being res judicata. Concerning this issue the court on appeal stated as follows:
"Assurning, without so deciding, that the
judgment in action No. 8936 was and is a bar to
another act!on to enforce the express contract, it
was not' a bar to the maintenance of this· action
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which was brought to recover on a quantum
meruit. The general rule applicable is stated in
34 C. J. 806, as follows: 'Where a plaintiff is
defeated in an action based on a certain theory
of his legal rights or as to the legal effects of a
given transaction or state of facts through failure
to substantiate his view of the case, this will not
as a rule preclude him from renewing the litigation, without any change in the facts, but basing
his daim on a new and more correct theory.' To
the same effect is 30 An1. Jur., Judgments, ~ection
210, page 946. And the author in 34 C. J., at page
807, states: 'The gene~al rule that a judgment
for defendant will not bar a subsequent action bv
plainb.ff based on a new and more correct theory
applies where plaintiff, in an action to recover
on an express contract for services to be rendered
or goods to be furnished, has been defeated on
the ground that the contract was invalid, or was
not proved, or had not been fully performed.'
The court properly heid that the judgment in
case No. 8936 is not a bar to the maintenance of
this action.''
In Hansen v. Jones, 115 Colo. 1, 168 P. 2d 263, the
plaintiff b~ou~ht ,an action for money had and received
against numer,ous defendants including A. J. West, President of the defendant hank. Prior to this action the
plaintiff had sued A. J. West for conversion of personal
property and a judgment of dismissal was entered in
that action. The judgment in part provided as follows:
"That the evidence is totally lacking in anything which connects the defendant with possession, dorninion or control of the cattle or the s~ale
there.of. The defendant had control over the pro-
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ceeds, the price received at the sale. It may be
that there was a eonersion of money. If there was
a conversion of anything it was of the price and
not of the cattle and the plaintiff cannot recover.
Let judgment enter dismissing the cause."
The def.endant in the subsequent action introduced
the prior judgment as res judicata as to him. On this
particular point the court states as f'ollows:
"Upon the face of the decision in the former
case, it would seem that the judgn1ent of dismissal
was rendered because of plaintiff's misconception
of the remedy available, and, in effect, was without prejudice to his right to sue for the proceeds.
In such circumstances plaintiff was 'entitled to
bring the proper proceedings to enforce his cause
of action.' 30 Am. J ur., p. 946, section 210"
The court also ,state:
. ''Under conditions somewhat analagous, we
have lJ.eld, upon the principle first mentioned, that
the dismissal on the merits of a cause of action
upon an expressed contract was not a bar to the
institution of a new action upon an implied contract or upon quantum meruit.'' (Citation of Authorities).
In Maine vs. Losser Auto Exchange 129 So. 533, 10
La. App . .65 the plaintiff had brought a prior action
against the same defendant wherein the plaintiff alleged
that he had sold the car to the defendant, and he sought
to recover the purchase price. In the prior action the
decision was given for the defendant. The plaintiff then
instituted· an action on the grounds tha:t the defendant
was iiable to the plaintiff as a bailee. The defendant
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urged 'as a defense res judicata ·and estoppel. The court
in discussing these defenses stated as follows:
''A reading of the decision in that suit shows
that this court did not pass upon the question of
whether defendant 'vas liable as bailee, and based
its refusal to hold defendant liable solelv on the
grounds that a Contract of Sale was all~ged but
not proven. This court said: 'The plaintiff's
counsel argues that the defendant is liable to him
as a depository or broker because he failed to
take proper precautions for the safety of his property. \Vithout discussing the n1erits of this contention we observe that it is a totally different
cause of action from that set out in plaintiff's
· petition and inconsistent herewith ***."
' 'It is plain, then, that since, in that case, the
liabilitv vel non of defendant as bailee was not
considered, ·and since the question of whether or
not there is liability as bailee is the only question
presented here, the first suit does not constitute
res judicata.''
In Go1dsmith-Leslie Co. v. Whitehead, 152 S. E. 589,
41 Ga. App. 287 a suit in Trover to recover property from
a eonditional purchaser was not barred by previous
judgment on purchase-money notes.
In Hanson v. S. & L. Drug Co., 212 W. 731, 203 Iowa
384 the plaintiff was required to elect he'tween open ac·count or account stated and elected to stand on account
stated, 'and it wa;s held that the judgment denying recovery was not a bar to a subsequent action on open
accDunt.
In in re Geagen 's Estate, 41 A. 2d 213, 136 N. J. eq.
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239 a judg-ment of nonsuit in an action at law against
an administrator ·based on fraud in administration of estate was not res judicata in subsequent proceedings in
orphans' court to hold adminis•trator liable to estate for
depletion 'there·of resulting from his negligence in carrying out duties as administrator.

In Burke v. Willard, 144 N. E. 223, 249 Mass. 313 a
judg1nent for defendant tenant in action by nwrtgagee to
recover for use and occupation, on ground that defendant
wws a ·tenant at sufferance, did not bar a subsequent action by mortgagee in tort to recover mesne profits accruing after entry, on theory that tenant was trespasser.
In Adams v. Powell, 142 So. 537, 225 Ala. 300 a disInissa;l of wife's heirs' suit, seeking specific perforn1ance
on 'theory that wife purchased land from husband was
not res judicata of suit to quiet title by same heirs on
theory transaction con:stituted equitable mortgage.
The Appellants quote ext~nsively from a motion and
argument for a rehearing filed with the Arizona Supreme
Court and then argue that since the petition advances
the same theory as the one tried in the Utah District
Court, the denial of the petition constitutes an adjudica•ti.on of that theory. Such is not the case. No opinion
was written in denying the petition.
A denial of a petition for rehearing does not adjudicate. the is~ues ar~ed in the petition. Such a petition
suggests that the decision of the Court is wrong and
should be reconsidered. The denial of th_e petition af-
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firms the original holding as being the court's final decrsion. The Arizona Court in denying the petition f.or
rehearing merely affirms that the court did not err in
holding that the action was solely to recover money
loaned. The decision and rule of the court, therefore,
is contained in their written decisron. To determine the
extent and the effect of the holding of· the Arizona Supreme Court one must look to its wri1tten decision which
clearly states that the sole issue for determination is
one of whether the record will support a cause ·of action
for money loaned.
Parts of the decisron are as follows :
''The sole question to be dettermined in this
case is whether the evidence substantiates plaintiff's cause of action for money loaned. ***"
·'A careflrl and close analysis of the plaintiff's testimony shows that he nowhere testified
directly to having made a loan. The sru11 and substance of hits testilnony is to the effect that he had
orally agreed to purcha~e the property; that all
of the terms and cond~tions had been ~agreed upon
except one, *** ''

''It must be remembered that the judgment
under consideration is predicated solely on a cornplaint for money loaned. The cause of action is
not for a rescission of the contract and was not
tried on that theory, and did not seek the return
of the $5,000 on this basis. * * * ''
''Plaintiff having failed to produce any direct
testimony or any testimony from which an infer-.
ence might ~be reasonably drawn to substanrtiate.
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the theory of a loan, we are em.; pelled to hold that
the judgment is wholly unsubstantiated by any
competent evidence. Undoubtc•fllY the trial court
was influenced hy the fact that· the defendants,
some sixty days after the abandonment of the
contract by plaintiff, were able to and did ~ell the
court for $210,000 hut upon different terms. Counsel have also argued that it would he unfair and
inequitable to allow defendants to retain the
money upon the theory that such retention would
constitute an lmjust enrichment. This argument
has no place here because such a suggestion would
have to be predicated upon the theory of a contract and its rescission. "\V e are not here concerned with the rights of a purchaser in a contract
for the sale and purchase of land where the right
of recission is clai1ned or the a ttemp't is made to
avoid a forefeiture. Plaintiff bases his right to
recover the $5,000 here invofved and the judgment
of the tria:l court was based solely upon the ground
of a loan to defendants. As 81hove pointed out,
this claim is wholly unsupported by the plaintiff's
evidence though giving it, and all :reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, full faith and
credit.
"The judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the cause re1nanded to the trial court with
disections to enter judgment for the defendant. ***"
It is obvious from the foregoing decision that the
holding of. the court merely concludes that the Respondent is not entitled to recover the sum of $5,000 on the
theory of money l'oaned. The decision specifically exCludes any intimation as to the results which might he
seeured upon a retri'al on a different theory. It is further
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clear from the decision and the facts of the case that
neither the Respondent nor the Appellant have had adjudicated or determined their respective rights which
reference to the sum of $5,000. The only holding is that
the Respondent is not entitled to the money on the basis
of money loaned.
The Utah trial court found upon the merits of the
case in favor of the Respondent. The Appellants do
not challenge such a determination. Since the action is
not barred by the decision of the Arizona court, the judgment should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INTEREST TO
RESPONDENT ON THE $5,000.00 FOR THE PERIOD OF
TIME THE MONEY WAS \VRONGFULLY \VITHHELD BY
APPELLANTS. (Reply to Appellants, Point IV)

The Appellants main contention under P.oint IV is
that they cannot understand upon what theory the court
awarded interest. The 0ourt found that the Respondent
wa;s entitled to have the $5,000.00 deposit returned to
him aml therefore assessed interest for the wrongful
withholding of said money for the period of September
5, 1947 to November 2, 1949. The Appellants on appeal
have not challanged the court's findings on the factual
Issues.
The record shows tha:t on July 14 the Respondent
with h'is attorney met with the attorney for the Appellants and advised them that the contract could not be
consummated and demanded a return of the m·oney. (R.
55)
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On August 29, 1947 a letter \Yas written to the Appellant's attorney ag-ain demanding- repaynwnt of the
$5,000.00. (Ex. P-8) A second letter dated September
5, 1947 written by the Respondent likewise demanded
return of the $5,000.00. The court apparently took the
last date of demand for the purpose of computing intere~st. Two garnishee judgments were entered by the
Arizona court on the 2nd day of December, 1949 by virtue
of which Respondent received payment of the $5,000.00.
Copies of these judgments were introduced, although
unmarked as an exhibit, as part of the record received
from the Arizona courts.
The court having found that the Respondent was
leially entitled to a return of his $5,000.00, it p:roperly
awarded damages for the period of time that said money
was wrongfully withheld, namely, from September 5,
1947 to November 2, 1949. Interest was computed at the
legal :rate of 6 per cent per annum as provided by Sec.
15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It has long been -established in Utah that interest is
aHowed on debts overdue even in absence of a statute
or contract providing therefor. Wasatch Min. Co. vs.
Crescent Min. Co. 7 U. 8, 16 24 Pac. 586 Aff'd 151 U. S.
317, 38 Lawyers Edition 177, 14 S. CT. 348.
Even though the Appellants secured an order of
restitution for return ·of the money, at all times, a~ord
ing to the holding of the Utah trial court, the Respondent
had a counter cla~m arid setoff against the judgment for
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restitution and therefore there would be no offsetting
amount f'or interest on the Appellants' judgment.
In view of the court's findings, not ehallenged by
the Appellants, and the statutes and cases in the State
of Utah, it is manifest tha:t the court properly awarded
interest to the Respondents.
CONCLUSION
Giving full faith and credit to a decision of a sister
state is not here involved. The issue is whether the decision of the Arizona court is res judicata. Tl1e determination of this issue is resolved by determining if the
same cause of action was litigated by the Utah court. The
Arizona decision by its very tenns limits itself to an adjudication of a cause of action for money loaned. The
Utah court litigated a different cause of action o.f money
deposited in contemplation of a written contract to be
formed after the resolving of a condition precedent. The
condition precedent was never resolved and therefore
the Respondent was entitled to have returned to him
the deposit. The trial court so found. The Supreme
Court should affirm that decision.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Respondent
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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